Cover
Reviews
Half-title
Series information
Title page
Copyright information
Dedication
Table of contents
Foreword
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
1 Introduction
Dominant- Party Democracies
Dynamic Democracies
Fragile Democracies
Conclusion
Part I Dominant-Party Democracies
2 The Supreme Court of Singapore and the Promise of Enforceable Constitutional Conventions
Vellama and the Constitutional Duty to Fill a Vacancy
Systemic Deficiencies in Singaporeâ#x80;#x99;s Electoral System Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs)Gerrymandering of Electoral Boundaries
Enforceable Constitutional Conventions and the Constitutional Right to Vote
Conclusion
3 Malaysian Courts and Electoral Fraud
Integrity of the Electoral Roll
Declaratory Orders and the Use of Indelible Ink
Conclusion
4 Hong Kong Courts and Constitutional Contradictions
Judicial Extension of Electoral Rights
Village Representative Elections
Prisonersâ#x80;#x99; Voting Rights
Convicted Personsâ#x80;#x99; Right to Stand for Elections Judicial Preservation of the Electoral Status QuoCorporate Voting in Legislative Council Elections
Chief Executive Elections
Constitutional Dead-ends and Dialogue
Disparity of Voting Power within the Functional Constituencies (FCs)
Resignation of Legislators and By-elections
Oath-taking and the Ouster of Legislators
Conclusion
Part II Dynamic Democracies
5 The Supreme Court of India and Criminality in Politics
The Indian Supreme Court in a Dominant-Party Democracy
Indian Supreme Court in a Dynamic Democracy
Conclusion 6 The Constitutional Court of Taiwan and Calibrated Judicial ReviewTaiwanâ#x80;#x99;s Constitutional Court within a Dominant-Party Democracy
Taiwanâ#x80;#x99;s Constitutional Court within a Dynamic Democracy
The Constitutional Court as Non-partisan Arbiter
Conclusion
7 The Constitutional Court of Korea and Systemic Electoral Barriers
The Constitutional Court and Systemic Electoral Redress
Constitutional Anomaly of Campaign Regulations
Constitutional Court as Strategic Arbiter
Conclusion
Part III Fragile Democracies 8 The Constitutional Court of Thailand and Partisan JudgesThaksin Shinawatra and the Demise of the 1997 Constitution
The Constitutional Court and the 2007 Constitution
Conclusion
9 The Supreme Court of Pakistan: Accommodation and Defiance of Military Authority
Martial Law and the Courts
Civilian Rule in Pakistan
Return of Military Rule
Chief Justice Chaudhry and Musharraf
Conclusion
10 The Supreme Court of Bangladesh and Defensive Judicial Review
Bangladesh and Martial Law
The Post-Martial Law Judiciary ""Emergency Rule in Bangladesh (2007â#x80;#x93;2008)""

What is the relationship between the strength of a country's democracy and the ability of its courts to address deficiencies in the electoral process? Drawing a distinction between democracies that can be characterised as 'dominant-party' (for example Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong), 'dynamic' (for example India, South Korea, and Taiwan), and 'fragile' (for example Thailand, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), this book explores how democracy sustains and is sustained by the exercise of judicial power. In dominant-party systems, courts can only pursue 'dialogic' pathways to constrain the government's authoritarian tendencies. On the other hand, in dynamic democracies, courts can more successfully innovate and make systemic changes to the electoral system. Finally, in fragile democracies, where a country regularly oscillates between martial law and civilian rule, their courts tend to consistently overreach, and this often facilitates or precipitates a hostile take-over by the armed forces, and lead to the demise of the rule of law