Courts and democracies in ASIA /
- United Kingdom ; Cambridge University Press : 2017.
- xviii, 232 p. : 23 cm.
Cover Reviews Half-title Series information Title page Copyright information Dedication Table of contents Foreword Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1 Introduction Dominant- Party Democracies Dynamic Democracies Fragile Democracies Conclusion Part I Dominant-Party Democracies 2 The Supreme Court of Singapore and the Promise of Enforceable Constitutional Conventions Vellama and the Constitutional Duty to Fill a Vacancy Systemic Deficiencies in Singaporeâ#x80;#x99;s Electoral System Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs)Gerrymandering of Electoral Boundaries Enforceable Constitutional Conventions and the Constitutional Right to Vote Conclusion 3 Malaysian Courts and Electoral Fraud Integrity of the Electoral Roll Declaratory Orders and the Use of Indelible Ink Conclusion 4 Hong Kong Courts and Constitutional Contradictions Judicial Extension of Electoral Rights Village Representative Elections Prisonersâ#x80;#x99; Voting Rights Convicted Personsâ#x80;#x99; Right to Stand for Elections Judicial Preservation of the Electoral Status QuoCorporate Voting in Legislative Council Elections Chief Executive Elections Constitutional Dead-ends and Dialogue Disparity of Voting Power within the Functional Constituencies (FCs) Resignation of Legislators and By-elections Oath-taking and the Ouster of Legislators Conclusion Part II Dynamic Democracies 5 The Supreme Court of India and Criminality in Politics The Indian Supreme Court in a Dominant-Party Democracy Indian Supreme Court in a Dynamic Democracy Conclusion 6 The Constitutional Court of Taiwan and Calibrated Judicial ReviewTaiwanâ#x80;#x99;s Constitutional Court within a Dominant-Party Democracy Taiwanâ#x80;#x99;s Constitutional Court within a Dynamic Democracy The Constitutional Court as Non-partisan Arbiter Conclusion 7 The Constitutional Court of Korea and Systemic Electoral Barriers The Constitutional Court and Systemic Electoral Redress Constitutional Anomaly of Campaign Regulations Constitutional Court as Strategic Arbiter Conclusion Part III Fragile Democracies 8 The Constitutional Court of Thailand and Partisan JudgesThaksin Shinawatra and the Demise of the 1997 Constitution The Constitutional Court and the 2007 Constitution Conclusion 9 The Supreme Court of Pakistan: Accommodation and Defiance of Military Authority Martial Law and the Courts Civilian Rule in Pakistan Return of Military Rule Chief Justice Chaudhry and Musharraf Conclusion 10 The Supreme Court of Bangladesh and Defensive Judicial Review Bangladesh and Martial Law The Post-Martial Law Judiciary ""Emergency Rule in Bangladesh (2007â#x80;#x93;2008)""
What is the relationship between the strength of a country's democracy and the ability of its courts to address deficiencies in the electoral process? Drawing a distinction between democracies that can be characterised as 'dominant-party' (for example Singapore, Malaysia, and Hong Kong), 'dynamic' (for example India, South Korea, and Taiwan), and 'fragile' (for example Thailand, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), this book explores how democracy sustains and is sustained by the exercise of judicial power. In dominant-party systems, courts can only pursue 'dialogic' pathways to constrain the government's authoritarian tendencies. On the other hand, in dynamic democracies, courts can more successfully innovate and make systemic changes to the electoral system. Finally, in fragile democracies, where a country regularly oscillates between martial law and civilian rule, their courts tend to consistently overreach, and this often facilitates or precipitates a hostile take-over by the armed forces, and lead to the demise of the rule of law